La Cafetera is a Miami-based mobile coffee trailer and franchise concept, founded in 2020 and currently operating with a fleet of 4 self-owned trailers plus 1 franchised unit in Tampa (~2 months operating as of the initial conversation) — confirmed directly by the founder on an August 31, 2026 diligence call. The founder has expressed openness to Tati Food Group taking on La Cafetera as a second brand under a "Food Group" umbrella structure, leveraging the same tech and operations infrastructure built for tati. Three conversations have been held to explore this — an initial discovery meeting on July 29, 2026, a follow-up call on deal structure, and a diligence call on August 31, 2026 covering assets and debt. No term sheet, valuation, or signed agreement exists at this stage. This memo documents deal shape as discussed, flags open diligence items, and recommends next steps before any LOI is drafted.

La Cafetera operates branded mobile espresso trailers ("cafeteras") built around a patented trailer design (patent scope: U.S. only — does not extend to Canada). Coffee is sourced as green beans from three countries (~75% Brazil, plus Uganda and Ethiopia) and roasted domestically by a Florida-based third-party roaster/co-packer under an informal working relationship. The business is solo-operated with informal family support and no employees on payroll.

The founder proposed positioning La Cafetera as a second concept brand alongside tati. under a shared "Food Group" umbrella — not a rebrand, but a portfolio narrative that lets both concepts present as part of a larger, more institutional-looking operation when pitching shared or adjacent corporate accounts. This mirrors the internal-pilot role Keys Croquetas currently plays for the tati Incubator Program, but in the coffee/beverage vertical instead of packaged retail food.

• Existing pressure point creates urgency. A recurring venue partner (Factory Town, under the Insomniac umbrella) has told the founder they need to refresh their concept/menu or risk losing the relationship — the founder is actively motivated to formalize a bigger structure now rather than later.
• Tech reuse, not net-new build. The founder has zero backend today (bookings run through Instagram DMs). Tati's platform architecture — the same pattern used for franchise/location tracking discussed for other clients — could be reskinned into a La Cafetera franchisee portal (sales tracking, ordering, franchise fee payment) with limited incremental engineering.
• Cross-sell into the existing B2B pipeline. Corporate accounts already in the tati. sales pipeline (e.g., accounts with recurring on-site event or breakroom service needs) are a natural cross-sell surface for morning coffee service alongside meal programs.
• Founder-side event network. The founder has direct, personal relationships with Insomniac (music festival circuit) and a Toronto-based coffee/wellness event brand ("Coffee Party") that could plausibly extend to future tati. or Food Group placements — unverified as a formal opportunity, but worth tracking.
• Explicitly not a rebrand. The founder is attached to the existing La Cafetera logo and does not want to lose the family-business feel. Scope discussed is limited to (1) tech/backend integration, (2) an updated website, and (3) operational efficiency — not a visual identity overhaul.

Nothing below has been agreed to in a binding sense. It reflects the shape of the conversation and should not be treated as offered or accepted terms.

No P&L, bank statements, or COGS detail have been provided. All figures below are as stated verbally by the founder and have not been independently diligenced.

One prior franchise buyback was executed at a $6,000 payout (versus the standard $20,000) after the franchisee only paid seven months of the required annual term before exiting — the founder's stated rationale for structuring the buyback this way. The City of Miami relationship (daily AM shift, admin building/police presence) was cited as a stable recurring account but no contract value was shared.

La Cafetera, Inc.'s Google Drive data room has been reviewed across four partial calendar years — bank statement folders exist for 2020–2026 in total, but only 2022, 2024, 2025, and 2026 have statements uploaded, and several individual months are still missing within those years (noted below). Profit & Loss, Balance Sheet, and Tax Return folders exist in the data room but are currently empty — no P&L or tax filings have been provided yet. All figures below are gross deposit totals from Chase Business Complete Checking, not net revenue, and have not been adjusted for chargebacks, refunds, processor fees, or COGS.

Deposit sources include daily card-processor settlements ("Bankcard"), event/venue payouts routed through a third-party processor ("DLS Events LLC" — likely the settlement agent for festival/venue bookings such as Insomniac-affiliated events), Zelle payments from individual clients, occasional wire transfers, and remote check deposits. Cash cushion is thin throughout the whole period reviewed, not just 2026 — month-end balances go negative in multiple months across 2022, 2024, and 2025 as well, so this is a structural pattern, not a one-time dip.

Recurring related-party-looking deposits, now confirmed across two separate years: "Cafecito & Co, LLC" and "Cuban Cafecito Co LLC" appear repeatedly as counterparties. Most notably, two $20,000 "Book Transfer Credit" deposits landed in June 2025, both referenced "Half Deposit For LA Cafetera (Cafecito&CO)" — i.e. $40,000 in what reads as a capital contribution or loan, not operating revenue. The same counterparty family sent two further wires totaling $15,000 in March 2026. This is now a repeat pattern across two years, not a one-off, and it must be excluded from any revenue base used for lending or valuation purposes until the founder confirms what this relationship actually is.

The chart and calculator below use every month of Chase Business Complete Checking data pulled from the data room so far. Toggle years on/off in the chart; adjust the revenue base and margin assumption in the calculator below to stress-test different scenarios. Gaps in coverage (months not yet uploaded to the data room) are skipped rather than shown as zero.

Reading the trend: gross deposit volume roughly doubled from 2022 to 2024–2026, and the most recent five quarters (mid-2025 through mid-2026) have held in a fairly narrow $40K–$45K/month adjusted band rather than continuing to grow — worth asking the founder directly whether that's a plateau or seasonal noise once more months are available.

This section is a modeling tool for internal use and for framing conversations with capital partners — it is not an underwriting output and should not be shared externally as a lending decision input. Real SBA 7(a) underwriting requires 2–3 years of business tax returns, an accountant-prepared P&L and balance sheet, personal financial statements and credit review for any guarantor, and a global cash flow analysis across all the guarantor's obligations — none of which exist for La Cafetera, Inc. yet. This calculator instead uses the one thing that is verified (bank deposit volume) and lets you flex an assumed net margin, since no COGS or opex data has been provided. Treat every DSCR value below as directional, not a lending conclusion.

SBA 7(a) lenders commonly look for a minimum DSCR around 1.25× (varies by lender and program); many will not proceed below 1.15×–1.20× even with strong collateral. Given the thin cash cushion documented in Section 11 and the existing MCA debt identified in Section 09, a DSCR that clears 1.25× on this illustrative model does not by itself mean La Cafetera, Inc. is bankable.

No P&L exists in the data room — this entire section is reconstructed from bank transaction data, not an accountant-prepared financial statement. It should be labeled and treated as such in any downstream use. Categories below are built from the visible line-item detail in the statements reviewed (not every month has full line-item visibility) and from the monthly summary categories (Deposits, ATM/Debit Withdrawals, Electronic Withdrawals, Fees) every statement provides.

These are the figures that should feed any DSCR or valuation conversation — not the raw gross deposit totals in Section 06, which still include the flagged non-operating inflows in the chart itself (chart is directional/trend-only; use the table above for actual modeling).

This is the full chronological run, not split by calendar year — every month with a statement pulled so far, in sequence, adjusted to exclude the MCA draws and related-party deposits identified in Section 06/07. Gaps are months where no statement has been pulled yet, not zero-revenue months.

"(adj.)" months have had an identified MCA draw or related-party deposit removed — see Section 06/07 for the specific amount excluded in each case. Month-over-month swings of 20–40% are common in both directions and appear driven by event/festival calendar timing (e.g. large single-event settlements like the $16,703 Volume Services payment in June 2026) rather than a smooth underlying trend — worth keeping in mind when annualizing any single month.

The two tables below are built from every transaction line in the January and June 2026 statements — not summary categories. These are the two months with full detail pulled so far; they bookend H1 2026 and show a business that changed materially over that period. Figures are reconciled to each statement's stated totals within ~1–2% (small residual is OCR-extraction rounding on dozens of sub-$100 line items, not a methodology error).

What this reconstruction actually shows: after paying identifiable business operating costs, roughly half of each month's outflows are informal Zelle payments to named individuals, family transfers, personal credit-card/financing payments, unexplained lump sums, and heavy peer-to-peer/cash activity. This is not a fraud finding — it is a bookkeeping and commingling problem, and it is exactly why no clean P&L can be produced without the founder's direct input on what each of these payment streams actually is.

Because a large share of each month's outflows are ambiguous (Section 08 above), NOI cannot be stated as a single number in good faith. Instead, three tiers are built from the same Jan/Jun 2026 line-item data, differing only in how the ambiguous categories are treated: Low treats every ambiguous dollar as a real business cost; High treats every ambiguous dollar as a personal owner draw (add-back); Mid splits the two largest ambiguous buckets (ATM/Apple Cash, unexplained withdrawals) 50/50 and treats named-individual Zelle payments as real labor cost throughout.

This NOI range — not the DSCR calculator's default 10% margin assumption in Section 07 — is the more rigorous basis for a lending conversation. The calculator's 10% default happens to sit close to the Low-tier margin found here, which is reassuring, but the calculator should be re-run at each of these three margins to see the full range of outcomes rather than relying on one point estimate.

No balance sheet exists in the data room. The items below are what can be reconstructed from bank data and founder statements; there is no way to state total assets, total liabilities, or equity with any confidence, and this should not be presented as a balance sheet to a lender or investor without the founder's own accounting records.

The figures below marked "founder-confirmed" come directly from a diligence call with John Fernandez on August 31, 2026 — a real improvement over the bank-statement inference used elsewhere in this memo, but still unaudited and not independently verified (no invoices, titles, or appraisals reviewed yet).

Do not net the Asset Schedule against the Debt Schedule above to produce a "net worth" figure — draws identified are not the same as outstanding balances (some may already be repaid), and the asset total is a gross replacement-cost estimate, not a liquidation or book value. Both schedules should be treated as inputs for further diligence, not as a substitute balance sheet.

Bottom line: on the evidence available, La Cafetera, Inc. likely carries meaningful existing high-cost debt (MCA) against a thin cash position and an unverified equipment base. Any acquisition or lending structure needs a real balance sheet and MCA payoff/subordination confirmation before proceeding past pre-LOI.

The following came up in conversation but are not part of the Coffeepot evaluation and should not gate its progress. Flagging here so they aren't lost.

• Packaging/co-packer introduction (Kia, Soflow Snacks). A Florida-based packaging and merchandise contact, introduced via Daniel Shirazi (Forefront Global), could unblock the founder's retail packaging bottleneck. Also carries an adjacent, unconfirmed line into a Jake Paul-affiliated family office as a possible capital source — speculative, unverified.
• Coffee Party (Toronto). A wellness/music-event coffee brand the founder has a personal relationship with; floated as a co-marketing or distribution channel, not yet explored formally.
• Canadian investor group. Referenced $200K minimum check size, which the founder's own franchise unit economics could plausibly absorb — unrelated to the Coffeepot evaluation itself.
• Two real estate parcels (unrelated family holdings). A Miami auto-dealership lot (currently used by the founder's mother's car sales operation) and a waterfront lot in Islamorada (former "Mr. Lobster" site, address to be confirmed — approximately 7455 Overseas Highway, Islamorada, FL) are both owned free-and-clear by the founder's aunt. A land-contribution JV structure (aunt contributes land, capital partner funds build) was discussed hypothetically. This should be scoped and evaluated as an entirely separate real estate opportunity, independent of Project Coffeepot.

• Ask the founder by name whether Itria Ventures LLC and Funding Metrics LLC are still active — he did not mention either when directly asked about debt on the Aug 31 call, despite ~$106,275 in identified draws and ongoing repayment through June 2026. This is now the top diligence priority, ahead of the unexplained withdrawals below.
• Ask the founder directly what the two unexplained "Other Withdrawals" are ($8,000 on 6/1/26 and $1,363 on 6/15/26).
• Resolve the trailer-builder IP entanglement — the builder separately constructed a competing coffee-and-food combo trailer under the same patent relationship after a prior JV attempt fell through; founder says this needs a sale-split or destruction. Get this in writing before any deal structure assumes clean IP.
• Request the outstanding financials directly. The data room's P&L, Balance Sheet, and Tax Return folders exist but are empty — ask the founder (or his bookkeeper) to populate them, since bank statements alone won't resolve true margin or the cash-cushion risk flagged in Section 11.
• Confirm outstanding MCA balances and terms with Itria Ventures LLC and Funding Metrics LLC directly — total monthly debt service has held roughly flat (~$2,200–$2,600/month) even as the repayment structure changed, and outstanding principal is still unconfirmed.
• Clarify the "Cafecito & Co" / "Cuban Cafecito Co" relationship directly with the founder — this is now a confirmed repeat pattern ($40K in Jun 2025, $15K in Mar 2026) and must be resolved before it can be excluded or included in any lending or valuation conversation with confidence.
• Get invoices for the trailer builds and vehicle titles — founder referenced having "black and white" invoices from the trailer builder and has agreed in principle to locate them; also request titles/registration for both tow vehicles to confirm business ownership and lien status.
• Fill the remaining coverage gaps (2020–2021, 2023, plus missing months within 2022/2024/2025) from the data room to firm up the multi-year trend in Section 06 and the P&L reconstruction in Section 08.
• Engage Emanay Law Group to run trademark clearance and filing on "La Cafetera" before any public co-branding or Food Group announcement, and to confirm current shareholder(s) of La Cafetera, Inc. against its 1,000 authorized shares.
• Request the existing Tampa franchise agreement and any event/venue contracts (e.g., Insomniac-affiliated events, City of Miami) for review.
• Turn the ~$300K case-study cost benchmark into a real internal budget so Tati Food Group can size its actual cost exposure before proposing a cost-share structure to the founder.
• Scope the tech buildout as a platform extension (reusing the Incubator Program's portal architecture patterns) rather than a net-new build, and get a rough engineering estimate.
• Decide the deal's legal shape — equity roll-up into Tati Food Group, a licensing/revenue-share arrangement, or a services-for-equity structure — before drafting any LOI.
• Hold the two real estate parcels as an independent workstream; do not let their diligence (zoning, environmental/Brownfield study) block or get conflated with Coffeepot's progress.
• Reconnect with the founder within the week, per his explicit ask for a clear line of sight on next steps, and deliver the mapped-out plan discussed on the follow-up call.